Digging Value: Quantitative Easing But With Gold

Digging Value is a twice-a-week column where I deep dive into markets, mining, and whatever financial absurdity caught my attention.

If you like your investing insights (not advice!) grounded in cash flows, hard assets, and common sense—but also recognize that markets frequently ignore all three—you’ll probably enjoy this.

Let’s explore the wild world of value investing in natural resources together. 

Today’s column: Investment bankers are people too, China plays copper arbitrage, and Bolivia buys gold from itself. 

“Digging for Value, One Story At A Time.”

Investment Bankers Are People Too

Mining M&A looks a lot like any other investment banking M&A deal:

  1. Company A says, “I want more exposure to copper, so let’s buy a copper company.” 
  2. An Investment Banker morphs out of the corner of the office like The Grudge and says, “Beautiful. Let me find you the perfect suitor.” 
  3. Once they’ve found a potential match, they facilitate initial contact and gauge interest. It’s like that first awkward coffee date, but with more spreadsheets and fewer awkward silences.
  4. Bankers dive deep into financials, operations, and legal standing.
  5. Terms are negotiated, and deals are structured.
  6. The parties finalize the deal, transfer ownership of the assets, and the Investment Banker … gets no credit or money? 

That last part happened to Ian Hannam (from the FT): 

“Ian Hannam, known as the “king of mining M&A”, was due $2mn in a fee dispute.

The trial featured star bankers and cast rare light on the behind-the-scenes deliberations between corporate executives and advisers who work on major deals.

While Hannam came out on top, it wasn’t quite the payout he had hoped for. Hannam’s advisory firm Hannam & Partners demanded up to $18mn from the Canadian Mining group Barrick Gold.

The firm argued that it helped engineer a transformational 2018 merger with London-listed Randgold but was “pushed out” of the deal at the last minute.”

Hannam didn’t sign a contract stating, “Yes I am part of this deal and I expect to be paid when it’s over.” Instead, he used his word as his bond (I guess we’re still doing that today?). 

Meanwhile, Barrick assumed it didn’t have to pay Hannam because, ““Randgold and Barrick had “already been discussing a potential merger for years.””

So the M&A deal could’ve looked like this: 

  1. Barrick and Randgold exchange emails over a few years discussing a potential merger. 
  2. Someone CC’d Hannam on an email asking, “Hey we’ve been thinking about this for years, does this make sense?”
  3. Hannam replies, “Yeah sure, I can do all the paperwork when you’re ready.”
  4. The deal closes.
  5. Hannam leans back against his mahogany desk and thinks to himself, “well hey now, that email did cost me my time and energy.” 
  6. Hannam sends Barrick Gold an $18M invoice.

Again, that’s probably not how it happened. But maybe!

Either way, the judge felt bad for Hannam and awarded him $2M: 

“Even though Gleeson found that H&P hadn’t signed such a legally binding agreement for fees, he still ruled in the firm’s favour on a legal principle known as unjust enrichment.

Speaking after the ruling, Hannam said: “‘My word is my bond’ is still at the heart of a client relationship.” He said the judge had “underlined the tenets of this relationship, which have existed in the City of London for centuries”.”

So can I use this excuse if I tell my wife “I’ll do the dishes” but I wait until 10:30PM? 

“My word is my bond, and it is still at the heart of our relationship.” 


Quirky Copper Arbitrage

Here’s a quirky thing about copper markets: you can have two pieces of copper that are chemically identical, meet the same quality specifications, and yet trade at different prices simply because one has a piece of paper that the other doesn’t. 

According to MiningMx.com

“Shipments from Congo are typically equivalent grade (EQ) copper because producers have not paid to register it on an exchange such as the Shanghai Futures Exchange, meaning it can’t fulfil contracts in that market, said Reuters. That makes EQ copper comparatively cheaper than registered metal even though it meets the same quality specifications, it said.

Analysts and traders said they expect EQ copper’s import volume and market share to grow again this year. EQ copper accounted for 62% of China’s refined copper imports last year, up from just under half in 2022, said Reuters citing data from the Shanghai Metals Market.”

This is Regulatory Arbitrage 101. 

The copper is the same stuff, atomically speaking. If you melted down both types and analyzed them, you wouldn’t be able to tell which was which. But one has paid its exchange listing fee and a fancy piece of paper saying “I paid a listing fee”, and the other hasn’t. 

It’s like buying a designer handbag without the official authentication card. It’s the exact same bag, made in the exact same factory, but because it lacks that little piece of paper, you get it at a discount.

But there’s more to this story than “Of course China gets its copper at a discount.” 

Chinese operators dominate Congo’s copper belt. CMOC Group’s copper output jumped by 55% year-on-year to 650,000 tons in 2024. And Chinese companies like Zijin Mining and CITIC Metal have already signed agreements to purchase 80% of the output from Ivanhoe Mines’ (IVN) upcoming smelter in the DRC over the next three years.

It’s as if China decided to create its own dedicated copper supply chain, and while everyone else was busy watching copper prices on the LME, China just built it’s own.

Maybe China imports so much copper from the Congo because it has nothing better to do with it? Or maybe they want to build Strategic Reserves before they slap export bans on the red metal?

At the same time, the Congo doesn’t want all its copper eggs in one Chinese basket. In February, Marcellin Paluku, Deputy Director of Cabinet at the Ministry of Mines said: 

“Today, 80% of our mines are with a single partner [China]. So it’s a risk […]. You never know what might happen. That’s why we’re now trying to diversify our partnerships so as not to depend on a single partner,”

That’s probably why the DRC wants to strike a minerals deal with the US. 

If I’m Trump, I’m taking that deal, but only if we can get that special “no paper certificate” discount they give China. 


Bolivia Buys More Gold

There is a whole genre of central banking where the central bank buys government bonds, which means that the government owes money to itself, and then the government pays interest on those bonds to itself. We call this pumping the stock market “quantitative easing” in the United States. 

Gold bugs hate that kind of stuff – they buy gold precisely because governments are allowed to do quantitative easing. 

But what if a country did this with gold? 

“Bolivia’s state-run gold trading firm, Epcoro, plans to quadruple its purchases of gold this year. The move is aimed at bolstering reserves of the precious metal for the nation’s central bank, which is currently grappling with financial difficulties.

Epcoro has already procured a ton of gold this year from small-scale Bolivian producers. This amount contrasts with the total of 2.4 tons procured last year, according to the firm’s Chief Executive Officer, Pablo Cesar Perez.

Perez shared in an interview in La Paz that Epcoro projects to sell approximately 10 tons of gold to the central bank this year.”

The Bolivian central bank wants to own gold. Gold is traditionally a good thing for a central bank to have because it acts as a reserve backing the currency, which they can also sell in emergencies. 

There’s just one problem: Bolivia’s central bank is running out of gold. 

“The central bank has nearly exhausted its cash and gold reserves as it struggles to finance fuel subsidies. Earlier this week, the government announced that it could no longer afford to provide fuel subsidies for all, resulting in a reduction of support for miners and farmers.”

You know I love real-world circular references, and this one’s a doozy. 

The government has a left pocket and a right pocket. It takes gold from small miners, puts it in the left pocket (Epcoro), then transfers it to the right pocket (the central bank). 

It begs the question, “why have Epcoro as a middleman in the first place?” 

Answer: To protect against central banks buying gold from illegal mining operations. 

*Insert Agness Harkness winking meme*


Other Digs

Related Posts

Subscribe To Our Newsletter

Brandon Beylo

Value Investor

Brandon has been a professional investor focusing on value for over 13 years, spending his time in small to micro-cap companies, spin-offs, SPACs, and deep value liquidation situations. Over time, he’s developed a deeper understanding for what deep-value investing actually means, and refined his philosophy to include any business trading at a wild discount to what he thinks its worth in 3-5 years.

Brandon has a tenacious passion for investing, broad-based learning, and business. He previously worked for several leading investment firms before joining the team at Macro Ops. He lives by the famous Munger mantra of trying to get a little smarter each day.

AK

Investing & Personal Finance

AK is the founder of Macro Ops and the host of Fallible.

He started out in corporate economics for a Fortune 50 company before moving to a long/short equity investment firm.

With Macro Ops focused primarily on institutional clients, AK moved to servicing new investors just starting their journey. He takes the professional research and education produced at Macro Ops and breaks it down for beginners. The goal is to help clients find the best solution for their investing needs through effective education.

Tyler Kling

Volatility & Options Trader

Former trade desk manager at $100+ million family office where he oversaw multiple traders and helped develop cutting edge quantitative strategies in the derivatives market.

He worked as a consultant to the family office’s in-house fund of funds in the areas of portfolio manager evaluation and capital allocation.

Certified in Quantitative Finance from the Fitch Learning Center in London, England where he studied under famous quants such as Paul Wilmott.

Alex Barrow

Macro Trader

Founder and head macro trader at Macro Ops. Alex joined the US Marine Corps on his 18th birthday just one month after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He subsequently spent a decade in the military. Serving in various capacities from scout sniper to interrogator and counterintelligence specialist. Following his military service, he worked as a contract intelligence professional for a number of US agencies (from the DIA to FBI) with a focus on counterintelligence and terrorist financing. He also spent time consulting for a tech company that specialized in building analytic software for finance and intelligence analysis.

After leaving the field of intelligence he went to work at a global macro hedge fund. He’s been professionally involved in markets since 2005, has consulted with a number of the leading names in the hedge fund space, and now manages his own family office while running Macro Ops. He’s published over 300 white papers on complex financial and macroeconomic topics, writes regularly about investment/market trends, and frequently speaks at conferences on trading and investing.

Macro Ops is a market research firm geared toward professional and experienced retail traders and investors. Macro Ops’ research has been featured in Forbes, Marketwatch, Business Insider, and Real Vision as well as a number of other leading publications.

You can find out more about Alex on his LinkedIn account here and also find him on Twitter where he frequently shares his market research.