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Lessons From a Trading Great: Ray Dalio

Ray Dalio is the founder of Bridgewater. Two years ago, Bridgewater surpassed Soros’ Quantum fund for the title of most profitable hedge fund of all time; returning over $46 billion since inception. Read more

Paul Tudor Jones

Lessons from a Trading Great: Paul Tudor Jones (PTJ)

From Jack Schwager’s Market Wizards:

October 1987 was a devastating month for most investors as the world stock markets witnessed a collapse that rivaled 1929. That same month, the Tudor Futures Fund, managed by Paul Tudor Jones, registered an incredible 62 percent return. Jones has always been a maverick trader. His trading style is unique and his performance is uncorrelated with other money managers. Perhaps most important, he has done what many thought impossible: combine five consecutive, triple-digit return years with very low equity retracements. (I am fudging slightly; in 1986, Paul’s fund realized only a 99.2 percent gain!) Read more

Stanley Druckenmiller

Lessons From A Trading Great: Stanley Druckenmiller

The “greatest money making machine in history”, a man with “Jim Roger’s analytical ability, George Soros’ trading ability, and the stomach of a riverboat gambler” is how fund manager Scott Bessent describes Stanley Druckenmiller. That’s high praise, but if you look at Druckenmiller’s track record, you’ll find it’s well deserved. Read more

Lessons From A Trading Great George Soros.jpg

Lessons From A Trading Great: George Soros

Remember the scene from the 90’s classic, The Sandlot, where “Smalls” loses his father’s Babe Ruth autographed baseball to “The Beast” and the other kids question him in disbelief, saying: Read more

Lessons from a Trading Great: Jesse Livermore

“Boy Wonder”, “Boy Plunger” and the “Great Bear of Wall St.” are a few of the monikers Jesse Livermore was known by.

Livermore was immortalized in the trading classic Reminiscences of a Stock Operator by Edwin Lefevre — a book your author has read countless times over the years and still pulls new wisdom from with each revisit.

Reminiscences has stood the test of time because it, more than any other book, explains the fundamental truths that lie at the heart of successful speculation. It’s no doubt a reflection of Livermore’s deep and intimate understanding of this great game.

One of the ironies I’ve learned through years of dissecting the habits and practices of top traders like Livermore is that there is nothing special to what they do. I’m not implying that what they’re able to do isn’t impressive; of course it is. I simply mean that they have no special or secret knowledge or ability that’s unique to them.

Most people start out in this game looking for that “thing”; whether it be a special insight or indicator or strategy or whatever, that will show them how to win. They think if they can just find the secrets to what make the greats great, then they’ll be set. But in reality… if there’s any secret at all, it’s that there is no secret.

All of the important truths that a speculator needs to understand were plainly communicated by Livermore over 75 years ago.

Does that mean you can read Reminiscencesand instantly become a great trader? Well, let me ask you this: can you read the classic Ben Hogan’s Five Lessons on golf and go out and play scratch golf? Of course not! And that’s because both books have all the foundational knowledge you need to succeed but they don’t supply the practice that ingrains the lessons and transforms that knowledge into wisdom.

Here’s how Livermore put it, “The training of a stock trader is like a medical education. The physician has to spend long years learning anatomy, physiology, materia medica and collateral subjects by the dozen. He learns the theory and then proceeds to devote his life to the practice.”

The practice is the hard part. It takes time and a Herculean effort. Blisters and portfolio losses. There are no short-cuts. But practice without knowledge is wasted effort. It’s like trying to run on your hands because nobody ever told you to use your feet.

So with that, here’s the knowledge (with some commentary by me), as given by Livermore many years ago. What you do with it is up to you but I suggest you try running with your feet.

Learn How to Lose

An old broker once said to me: ‘If I am walking along a railroad track and I see a train coming toward me at sixty miles an hour, do I keep on walking on the ties? Friend, I sidestep. And I do not even pat myself on the back for being so wise and prudent.’

To be a great trader you have to be a great loser. Sounds like a contradiction right? Well it isn’t. The fact is, great traders will typically have more losing trades than profitable ones. They’ll spend more time in an equity drawdown than at new highs. Some of this is due to the natural 90/10 distributions of markets (Pareto’s Law), but much of it is actually by design.

Mark Spitznagel wrote in The Dao of Capital that the most valuable lesson he learned from his Chicago trading pit mentor, Everett Klipp, was that “you’ve got to love to lose money.” If you love to take small losses then you’ll never take a large one. That’s important because it’s the large ones that’ll kill ya’.

Humans are naturally averse to losing (obvious statement). Our psychological programming attaches a lot of nonsensical meaning to taking losses in the market. We are evolutionarily wired to be bad emotional traders. The key is to invert this instinctual response and learn to “love to lose”. Livermore talks about this inversion:

Losing money is the least of my troubles. A loss never bothers me after I take it. I forget it overnight. But being wrong — not taking the loss — that is what does damage to the pocketbook and to the soul.

And here’s a simple and yet KEY… KEY fundamental truth to good trading: never add to your losers, sell what shows you a loss, and let run what shows you a profit.

Of all speculative blunders there are few worse than trying to average a losing game. My cotton deal proved it to the hilt a little later. Always sell what shows you a loss and keep what shows you a profit. That was so obviously the wise thing to do and was so well known to me that even now I marvel at myself for doing the reverse.

This lesson was important enough that Paul Tudor Jones had it plastered on the wall right above his desk.

ptj_losers_average_losers

Livermore’s occasional failure to follow this rule is what led to the multiple blowups he experienced throughout his career. He lost when he failed to follow his advice that it’s “foolhardy to make a second trade, if your first trade shows you a loss. Never average losses. Let this thought be written indelibly upon your mind.”

Livermore learned the hard way that our natural instincts must be flipped.

Instead of hoping he must fear and instead of fearing he must hope. He must fear that his loss may develop into a much bigger loss, and hope that his profit may become a big profit.

The Importance of Understanding General Conditions

I still had much to learn but I knew what to do. No more floundering, no more half-right methods. Tape reading was an important part of the game; so was beginning at the right time; so was sticking to your position. But my greatest discovery was that a man must study general conditions, to size them so as to be able to anticipate probabilities.

Not many people realize this, but Livermore was the original “global macro” guy. His “greatest discovery” was the importance of macro — or what he called “general conditions”.

He had the same realization that hedge fund manager Steve Cohen had decades later, which is “that 40 percent of a stock’s price movement is due to the market, 30 percent to the sector, and only 30 percent to the stock itself.”

After Livermore made this discovery he said “I began to think of basic conditions instead of individual stocks. I promoted myself to a higher grade in the hard school of speculation. It was a long and difficult step to take.”

This revelation completely changed the way he approached markets and trading. While everybody was piking around, losing money playing the “stock picking” game, Livermore was studying general conditions. He now understood the simple fundamental truth that you want to be long in a bull market and short in a bear market.

I think it was a long step forward in my trading education when I realized at last that when old Mr. Partridge kept on telling the other customers, ‘Well, you know this is a bull market!’ he really meant to tell them that the big money was not in the individual fluctuations but in the main movements — that is, not in reading the tape but in sizing up the entire market and its trend.

Disregarding the big swing and trying to jump in and out was fatal to me. Nobody can catch all the fluctuations. In a bull market your game is to buy and hold until you believe that the bull market is near its end. To do this you must study general conditions and not tips or special factors affecting individual stocks.

It’s when Livermore started playing the macro game that he really started making the big money.

I cleared about three million dollars in 1916 by being bullish as long as the bull market lasted and then by being bearish when the bear market started. As I said before, a man does not have to marry one side of the market till death do them part.

But I can tell you after the market began to go my way I felt for the first time in my life that I had allies — the strongest and truest in the world: underlying conditions. They were helping me with all their might. Perhaps they were a trifle slow at times in bringing up the reserves, but they were dependable, provided I did not get too impatient.

General conditions (macro) continue to be — BY FAR — the biggest potential source for alpha in trading. That’s because most market participants are still focused on the stock picking game and remain completely ignorant of the most significant driver of their stock’s price action. Learning to read the underlying conditions is like swinging the trading equivalent of Thor’s Hammer… it makes that much of a difference.

Patience, Psychology and the Dangers of Overtrading

It sounds very easy to say that all you have to do is to watch the tape, establish your resistance points and be ready to trade along the line of least resistance as soon as you have determined it. But in actual practice a man has to guard against many things, and most of all against himself — that is, against human nature.

Livermore understood man’s foibles perhaps better than most. He made and lost multiple fortunes, the size of which, most could hardly fathom. He knew well the fundamental truth that becoming a great trader is as much about self-mastery as it is about market mastery.

Market Wizard Ed Seykota said “I think that if people look deeply enough into their trading patterns, they find that, on balance, including all their goals, they are really getting what they want, even though they may not understand it or want to admit it.”

True professional speculation is often a tedious and boring affair, where one can go months without putting on a trade because the general conditions are not right.

There is a time for all things, but I didn’t know it. And that is precisely what beats so many men in Wall Street who are very far from being in the main sucker class.

Most traders that I see are not really in the game to make money by strictly following a sound trading process. They want quick profits; the thrill of gambling; high adrenaline entertainment. Basically the same lizard brain “wants” that drive the large profits for Vegas casinos.

This is why most people overtrade. And they overtrade a lot. Here’s Livermore’s thoughts on why that’s bad.

There is the plain fool, who does the wrong thing at all times everywhere, but there is the Wall Street fool, who thinks he must trade all the time. No man can always have adequate reasons for buying or selling stocks daily–or sufficient knowledge to make his play an intelligent play.

The overtrading by others brings us to another fundamental truth: that other’s impatience can be our profits if we’re willing to practice infinite patience.

The desire for constant action irrespective of underlying conditions is responsible for many losses on Wall Street even among the professionals, who feel that they must take home some money every day, as though they were working for regular wages. Remember this: When you are doing nothing, those speculators who feel they must trade day in and day out, are laying the foundation for your next venture. You will reap benefits from their mistakes.

When putting on a trade it’s better to be a little late than a little early. As Livermore put it, “don’t take action with a trade until the market, itself, confirms your opinion. Being a little late in a trade is insurance that your opinion is correct. In other words, don’t be an impatient trader.”

Self-mastery leads to market mastery. Livermore said “the human side of every person is the greatest enemy of the average investor or speculator. Fear keeps you from making as much money as you ought to. Wishful thinking must be banished.”

Price Action and Path of Least Resistance

There is what I call the behavior of a stock, actions that enable you to judge whether or not it is going to proceed in accordance with the precedents that your observation has noted. If a stock doesn’t act right don’t touch it; because, being unable to tell precisely what is wrong, you cannot tell which way it is going. No diagnosis, no prognosis. No prognosis, no profit.

Livermore was one of the best at reading the tape. His years of studying price action gave him a sort of “sixth sense” for knowing what the market was doing and where it was headed. This is one of those “practice” elements where only so much instruction can be given… the rest needs to be learned and experienced.

But one of the important lessons that Livermore talked about is studying price action in order to determine the “path of least resistance”, saying:

For purposes of easy explanation we will say that prices, like everything else, move along the line of least resistance. They will do whatever comes easiest, therefore they will go up if there is less resistance to an advance than to a decline; and vice versa.

The path of least resistance is all about understanding accumulation/distribution or consolidation/expansion zones. A chart is simply a two dimensional representation of supply/demand. The path of least resistance is the price level that supply/demand is likely to move towards based off past and current accumulation/distribution levels.

Learn to read supply and demand action with practice and your trading will become more fluid. Livermore stated, “It would not be so difficult to make money if a trader always stuck to his speculative guns — that is, waited for the line of least resistance to define itself and began buying only when the tape said up or selling only when it said down.”

A critical part to what he’s saying is to wait for the path of least resistance to present itself. Attempting to anticipate trend changes is a costly and foolish endeavor.

One of the most helpful things that anybody can learn is to give up trying to catch the last eighth — or the first. These two are the most expensive eighths in the world. They have cost stock traders, in the aggregate, enough millions of dollars to build a concrete highway across the continent.

Trend reversals are a process, not an event. Livermore notes “that a market does not culminate in one grand blaze of glory. Neither does it end with a sudden reversal of form. A market can and does often cease to be a bull market long before prices generally begin to break.”

The trend is your friend and there are separate trends on different time intervals. The more trends that line up on each interval, the lesser resistance on the trade’s path.

Big Bets and Sitting Tight

And right here let me say one thing: After spending many years in Wall Street and after making and losing millions of dollars I want to tell you this: It never was my thinking that made the big money for me. It was always my sitting. Got that? My sitting tight!

Men who can both be right and sit tight are uncommon. I found it one of the hardest things to learn. But it is only after a stock operator has firmly grasped this that he can make big money.

The average trader is quick to take a profit and slow to book a loss. Going back to the importance of inverting our trading nature, it’s as important to let profits run as it is to cut losses short. Remember, we’ll lose more than we’ll be right. So we need those winners to be significantly larger to pay for our losers. Livermore said, “they say you never grow poor taking profits. No, you don’t. But neither do you grow rich taking a four point profit in a bull market.”

Livermore explained successful trading plainly, “I study because my business is to trade. The moment the tape told me that I was on the right track my business duty was to increase my line. I did. That is all there is to it.”

The fundamental truths of speculation, as laid out by Livermore three quarters of a century ago, can be summarized as follows:

  • Cut your losses: Never average down and never hope losses reverse. Just cut.
  • Infinite patience: Good trades are few and far between. Trade for profits, not for action.
  • Learn macro: Understanding general conditions is essential to being a market master and not a piker.
  • Price action is king: Learn to read the tape and don’t argue with markets — they know more than you.
  • Big bet/sit tight: Ride your winners for all their worth. This conviction comes with practice.
  • Self-mastery: You are your greatest impediment to your own success. “Know thyself”.

These lessons are as true today as they were then. As Livermore put it, “there is nothing new in Wall Street. There can’t be because speculation is as old as the hills. Whatever happens in the stock market today has happened before and will happen again.”

One just needs to look to Stanley Druckenmiller — perhaps the closest modern day equivalent to Jesse Livermore — to see that these truths still hold true. Here’s Druck:

The first thing I heard when I got in the business, not from my mentor, was bulls make money, bears make money, and pigs get slaughtered. I’m here to tell you I was a pig. And I strongly believe the only way to make long-term returns in our business that are superior is by being a pig. I think diversification and all the stuff they’re teaching at business school today is probably the most misguided concept everywhere. And if you look at all the great investors that are as different as Warren Buffett, Carl Icahn, Ken Langone, they tend to be very, very concentrated bets. They see something, they bet it, and they bet the ranch on it. And that’s kind of the way my philosophy evolved, which was if you see – only maybe one or two times a year do you see something that really, really excites you… The mistake I’d say 98% of money managers and individuals make is they feel like they got to be playing in a bunch of stuff. And if you really see it, put all your eggs in one basket and then watch the basket very carefully.

Livermore said that “A man can have great mathematical ability and an unusual power of accurate observation

and yet fail in speculation unless he also possesses the experience and the memory. And then, like the physician who keeps up with the advances of science, the wise trader never ceases to study general conditions, to keep track of developments everywhere that are likely to affect or influence the course of the various markets.”

If you’d like to stop piking around and follow in Livermore’s footsteps by learning how to read general conditions (macro), then click here.

 

 

George Soros

Lies, Untruths, and False-Trends: George Soros on what really moves markets

George Soros was quoted in a speech he gave to the Committee for Monetary Research and Education back in the early 90’s as follows:

Economic history is a never-ending series of episodes based on falsehoods and lies, not truths. It represents the path to big money. The object is to recognize the trend whose premise is false, ride that trend, and step off before it is discredited.

“Falsehoods and lies…,” these are some striking words from one of the greatest traders of all time. It’s also profound insight into how markets really work.

What the Palindrome (his name is spelled the same forward and backwards) is really talking about here is his theory on false trends.

The idea of false trends in markets is predicated on the belief that contrary to common Western thinking, reality cannot be neatly packaged into true and false; black and white.

Rather, Soros believes that reality (and markets) should be classified into three categories:

● Things that are true
● Things that are untrue
● Things that are reflexive

He noted the importance of differentiating between these when he said:

The truth value of reflexive statements is indeterminate. It is possible to find other statements with an indeterminate truth value, but we can live without them. We cannot live without reflexive statements. I hardly need to emphasize the profound significance of this proposition. Nothing is more fundamental to our thinking than our concept of truth.

For those of you not familiar with the concept of reflexivity, go and read our explanation here, it’ll be worth your time.

The benefit of judging truth and untruth on a sliding scale versus fixed one has also been discussed by Nassim Taleb:

Since Plato, Western thought and the theory of knowledge have focused on the notions of True-False; as commendable as it was, it is high time to shift the concern to Robust- Fragile, and social epistemology to the more serious problem of Sucker-Nonsucker.

False trends arise when a dominant belief (what we refer to as a narrative) is founded on untrue assumptions, but the narrative is so strong it moves price action anyway. The false narrative’s effect on the market actually acts to reinforce the strength of the belief that its initial assumptions are correct; thus driving price action further away from reality (what is true) in a reflexive loop. This is how bubbles are created.

Soros discussed the large impact false trends can have on markets in his 2010 “Act II of the Drama” speech. Below is an excerpt and the full text can be found here:

Let me briefly recapitulate my theory for those who are not familiar with it. It can be summed up in two propositions. First, financial markets, far from accurately reflecting all the available knowledge, always provide a distorted view of reality. This is the principle of fallibility. The degree of distortion may vary from time to time. Sometimes it’s quite insignificant, at other times it is quite pronounced. When there is a significant divergence between market prices and the underlying reality I speak of far from equilibrium conditions. That is where we are now.

Second, financial markets do not play a purely passive role; they can also affect the so-called fundamentals they are supposed to reflect. These two functions that financial markets perform work in opposite directions. In the passive or cognitive function, the fundamentals are supposed to determine market prices. In the active or manipulative function market, prices find ways of influencing the fundamentals. When both functions operate at the same time, they interfere with each other. The supposedly independent variable of one function is the dependent variable of the other, so that neither function has a truly independent variable. As a result, neither market prices nor the underlying reality is fully determined. Both suffer from an element of uncertainty that cannot be quantified. I call the interaction between the two functions reflexivity. Frank Knight recognized and explicated this element of unquantifiable uncertainty in a book published in 1921, but the Efficient Market Hypothesis and Rational Expectation Theory have deliberately ignored it. That is what made them so misleading.

Reflexivity sets up a feedback loop between market valuations and the so-called fundamentals which are being valued. The feedback can be either positive or negative. Negative feedback brings market prices and the underlying reality closer together. In other words, negative feedback is self-correcting. It can go on forever, and if the underlying reality remains unchanged, it may eventually lead to an equilibrium in which market prices accurately reflect the fundamentals. By contrast, a positive feedback is self-reinforcing. It cannot go on forever because eventually, market prices would become so far removed from reality that market participants would have to recognize them as unrealistic. When that tipping point is reached, the process becomes self-reinforcing in the opposite direction. That is how financial markets produce boom-bust phenomena or bubbles. Bubbles are not the only manifestations of reflexivity, but they are the most spectacular.

In my interpretation equilibrium, which is the central case in economic theory, turns out to be a limiting case where negative feedback is carried to its ultimate limit. Positive feedback has been largely assumed away by the prevailing dogma, and it deserves a lot more attention.

I have developed a rudimentary theory of bubbles along these lines. Every bubble has two components: an underlying trend that prevails in reality and a misconception relating to that trend. When a positive feedback develops between the trend and the misconception, a boom-bust process is set in motion. The process is liable to be tested by negative feedback along the way, and if it is strong enough to survive these tests, both the trend and the misconception will be reinforced. Eventually, market expectations become so far removed from reality that people are forced to recognize that a misconception is involved. A twilight period ensues during which doubts grow and more and more people lose faith, but the prevailing trend is sustained by inertia. As Chuck Prince, former head of Citigroup, said, “As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We are still dancing.” Eventually a tipping point is reached when the trend is reversed; it then becomes self-reinforcing in the opposite direction.

Typically bubbles have an asymmetric shape. The boom is long and slow to start. It accelerates gradually until it flattens out again during the twilight period. The bust is short and steep because it involves the forced liquidation of unsound positions. Disillusionment turns into panic, reaching its climax in a financial crisis.

The simplest case of a purely financial bubble can be found in real estate. The trend that precipitates it is the availability of credit; the misconception that continues to recur in various forms is that the value of the collateral is independent of the availability of credit. As a matter of fact, the relationship is reflexive. When credit becomes cheaper, activity picks up and real estate values rise. There are fewer defaults, credit performance improves, and lending standards are relaxed. So at the height of the boom, the amount of credit outstanding is at its peak, and a reversal precipitates false liquidation, depressing real estate values.

The bubble that led to the current financial crisis is much more complicated. The collapse of the subprime bubble in 2007 set off a chain reaction, much as an ordinary bomb sets off a nuclear explosion. I call it a superbubble. It has developed over a longer period of time, and it is composed of a number of simpler bubbles. What makes the superbubble so interesting is the role that the smaller bubbles have played in its development.

The prevailing trend in the superbubble was the ever-increasing use of credit and leverage. The prevailing misconception was the belief that financial markets are self-correcting and should be left to their own devices. President Reagan called it the “magic of the marketplace,” and I call it market fundamentalism. It became the dominant creed in the 1980s. Since market fundamentalism was based on false premises, its adoption led to a series of financial crises. Each time, the authorities intervened, merged away, or otherwise took care of the failing financial institutions, and applied monetary and fiscal stimuli to protect the economy. These measures reinforced the prevailing trend of ever-increasing credit and leverage, and as long as they worked, they also reinforced the prevailing misconception that markets can be safely left to their own devices. The intervention of the authorities is generally recognized as creating amoral hazard; more accurately it served as a successful test of a false belief, thereby inflating the superbubble even further.

If nothing else, these words from Soros should impart a deep respect for the complexity of the trading game we play. It should also explain why, like the Palindrome, our approach to markets should start with the full acceptance of our own fallibility, first and foremost.

The occurrence of false trends will only rise as global information and interpretation flow increases and narratives become more uniformed and accordant. Taleb put it well, when he said:

The mind can be a wonderful tool for self-delusion – it was not designed to deal with complexity and nonlinear uncertainties. Counter to the common discourse, more information means more delusions: our detection of false patterns is growing faster and faster as a side effect of modernity and the information age: there is this mismatch between the messy randomness of the information-rich current world with complex interactions and our intuitions of events, derived in a simpler ancestral habitat – our mental architecture is at an increased mismatch with the world in which we live.

Look around you… do you see any false trends in the markets at the moment?

 

 

Michael Marcus

Lessons From a Trading Great: Michael Marcus

Michael Marcus turned $30,000 into $80 million over a 20 year period — not too shabby.

He was profiled in Schwager’s original classic Market Wizards, giving one of the more impressive interviews in a book filled with many. Read more

The Philosopher On Playing The Player

The Philosopher on Playing the Player

Market sentiment is a fuzzy concept.

In its most basic sense, it’s the aggregate beliefs and moods of actors that comprise the total market.

It’s tough to measure, gauge and test. And so, it’s often discarded completely or superfluously used to confirm one’s own biases. Read more

Bewar The Top Performers.

Beware The Top Performers

“And, at any point in time, the richest traders are often the worst traders. This, I will call the cross-sectional problem: At a given time in the market, the most successful traders are likely to be those that are best fit to the last cycle. This does not happen too often with dentists or pianists—because these professions are more immune to randomness.” Read more

Reflexivity and Soros

Understanding George Soros’ Theory of Reflexivity in Markets

My conceptual framework enabled me both to anticipate the crisis and to deal with it when it finally struck. It has also enabled me to explain and predict events better than most others. This has changed my own evaluation and that of many others. My philosophy is no longer a personal matter; it deserves to be taken seriously as a possible contribution to our understanding of reality. ~ George Soros (via FT) Read more